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Introduction: Ethnicity, Exclusion and
Democracy in Nepal
The political context and issues
Since 2006, Nepal has been undergoing a political
transition that could herald major changes in the society.
Some major political transformations have already taken
place (discussed below) while other change agendas are
being hotly debated. Two important contested issues are
the extent of socio-political inclusion of diverse ethnic
groups (ethnic/national, caste, religious, linguistic, and
regional identity) and forms of democratic structures for
the “new” Nepal. These contested issues are important for
two reasons. First, they will affect a majority of Nepalis.
Second, the country failed in both fronts in the past. The
majority of its diverse citizens were excluded from various
realms of social and political action for most of Nepal’s
two and half centuries of existence while attempts at
democratization since the fifties failed multiple times.
Being the oldest state in South Asia has not advantaged
Nepal in its democratic trajectory or in the accommodation
of its diverse ethnic groups.
In fact, both exclusion
and inequalities among ethnic groups and the failure of
democratization, two issues analyzed in this volume of
Himalaya, are the result of the Nepali state’s long history
of authoritarianism. Although people’s rights were slowly
being expanded in early democracies during this period
and even though the British Raj introduced local elections
and some level of representative government to its South
Asian colonies during the first half of twentieth century,
Nepal’s rulers were strengthening their authoritarian
regime even until the mid-twentieth century. Among other
things, inequality and exclusion, which are not favorable
for fostering democracy and could become inimical to it
as well, became entrenched during this long period of
authoritarian rule. The CHHEM (caste hill Hindu elite
males) consolidated their hold with the consolidation
of the state, and inequality as well as exclusion of many
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ethnic, caste, religious, and linguistic groups began,
continued or became consolidated during this period. The
inequalities and exclusionary norms and practices became
so entrenched that they largely continued even during the
short democratic interludes of the 1950s and 1990s. The
relatively open polity, however, energized activists of the
traditionally excluded groups to organize against their
marginalization and demand equal rights. The challenges
especially increased during the democratic years of 19902002 due to the considerable political rights to organize
and mobilize guaranteed in the 1990 Constitution. After
the ‘surprising’ rise of identity politics during the nineties,
exclusion began to receive increasing academic and political
attention. Considerable work has been carried out on this
issue but many aspects of exclusion are yet to be analyzed,
as the contributions of this volume make clear. The articles
in this volume will contribute to illuminate additional
dimensions of exclusion and inequality, including after the
multiple transitions to democracy.

Discourse on exclusion and
inequality: past and present
Nepal’s attempt at development, which began after
the 1951 transition to democracy, largely focused on
class inequality for most of the time. Development was
seen as reducing poverty through modernization by
targeting individual citizens. However, these policies
exacerbated inequality among various groups (Bista 1991).
The dominant group largely benefitted from the policies
because even though couched in universal discourse, the
policies and institutions were influenced by their values,
worldviews and interests (Lawoti 2005). For example,
recruitment to the civil service through exams conducted
in the native language of the dominant group resulted
in their overwhelming domination of the bureaucracy.
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The state promoted nationalism, which was based on hill
Hindu religious values, the Nepali language aka Khas-kura
of the dominant group, hill dress and the Hindu monarchy,
projected the ethos and worldviews of the dominant group as
universal while considering others as deviant.
Writing and discussing ethnic issues from a political
angle was considered taboo and discouraged even during
the late nineties (Hangen 2000; Kraemer 2003).1 Such an
environment restricted academic research on the issues of
exclusion and inequalities among different ethnic groups.
Anthropologists and social scientists produced a corpus
of knowledge on many ethnic groups that has contributed
to understanding the status, including unequal positions,
of those groups, but the studies rarely framed themselves
explicitly from the exclusion and inequality angle, largely
due to the unfriendly and constraining circumstances. This
does not mean that occasional academic work, even that
produced during the Panchayat regime, had not pointed out
exclusion (for instance, Gaige 1975; Beenhakker 1973; Rana
1971; Caplan 1970; Holmberg 1989), but exclusion had not
become a major theme of political or academic discourse
before 1990.
The exclusionary nationalism promoted by the state
began to be challenged after the polity opened up in 1990.
Political parties like the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Nepal
Goodwill Party), Rastriya Janamukti Party (National Peoples’
Liberation Party), Mongol National Organization and
associations of ethnic groups and NGOs of Dalits pointed
out the exclusion of the Dalit, indigenous nationalities, and
Madhesi from various socio-economic, cultural and political
realms and they argued that the previous development and
modernization policies had neglected or even discriminated
against them (Lawoti 2005; Hangen 2010). This new form of
nationalism that emerged from the society, and is empowering
the traditionally marginalized group, sharply contrasts and,
in fact, challenges the state led and imposed exclusionary
nationalism that had privileged the CHHE as the cost of Dalit,
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi and minority religious
groups like the Muslims.
Initial attention on exclusion pivoted around cultural
discrimination and on the under- or non-representation of
1. This situation has changed considerably, and as a result much more
work on these issues have been conducted. However, many members of
CHHE academia and media still project the social justice movements of the
ethnic groups as divisive (for examples of such opinions in recent years,
see Himal Khabarpatrika, which occasionally provides space for the “other”
perspectives and loves to project itself as a “professional” newsmagazine. See
International Crisis Group (2009) for a discussion of “mainstream” media
bias against the Maoists after the 2008 Constituent Assembly election. I
have been asked by some Bahun friends whether particular anthropologists
working on ethnic groups are Bahun birodhi (anti-Bahun). Historic context
is provided by Holmberg (2006), who has written that he was removed “for
his own safety” from a Tamang village he was studying in 1977 after being
implicated, with no fault of his or his host, in local symbolic ethnic politics.
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various groups in the governance of the country. Various
works pointed out that indigenous nationalities and Madhesi
were facing linguistic, religious, citizenship and other
forms of cultural discrimination, while Dalit were facing
caste-based discrimination and women were socially and
legally discriminated against (Bhattachan 1995; Gurung
et al. 2000; Jha 1993; Kisan 2005; FWLD 2000). Data on
representation of different groups in various influential state
and society sectors showed the overwhelming domination of
the CHHEM (Neupane 2000). The discussion of exclusion
from governance assumes that descriptive or bodily
representation is necessary for protecting the interests of
different groups. Other work pointed out material inequality
among ethnic groups as well, such as in access to education
and employment opportunities (NESAC 1998; World Bank
and DFID 2006).
Once exclusion among different groups even under
democracy was established and accepted to some extent in
the mainstream political and social discourse by late nineties,
work began to identify causes of exclusion. Many work
pointed out that formal institutions were the causes behind
the exclusions. Constitutional articles that discriminated
against native languages, minority religions, ethnic, caste
and identity groups, the first past the post electoral system,
and the unitary state etc. were pointed out as contributing
to exclusion (for example, see Bhattachan 2000; Khanal
2004; Lawoti 2005, 2007; Neupane 2000; FWLD 2000).
The ongoing political transformation is aimed at replacing
many of these formal exclusionary political institutions. The
papers in this volume of Himalaya, however, suggest that
formal political institutional reforms may not be enough to
ensure inclusion because exclusion in entrenched deeply
beyond the formal political arena.

Contents of this volume
The first three papers in this volume increase
understanding of exclusion and inter-group inequality
by analyzing newer dimensions of these phenomena,
including their causes and consequences, while the fourth
paper provides the political context in which exclusion has
continued, with a discussion of the multiple democratic
transitions Nepal has gone through.
Lawoti’s article points out that informal institutions by
themselves as well as in interaction with formal institutions,
contributed to exclusion by constraining, or creating
incentives, for political actors to behave in certain ways.
The article points out the role of the religiously supported
patriarchy on the exclusion of women, the role of the
Hindu caste system and the marginalization of Dalit and
other ‘lower’ castes like the indigenous nationalities, and it
discusses the role of hill nationalism in the exclusion of the
Madhesi. The informal institutions competed, substituted
or complemented formal institutions to often exclude the
marginalized groups (occasionally they promoted inclusion
as well). This suggests that exclusion may continue even if

new formal non-exclusionary institutions are established or
new laws ban certain informal exclusionary practices because
cultural attitudes die hard. The classic example is the practice
of untouchability even after the 1990 Constitution declared
it illegal. Thus, the ongoing reforms on the formal political
sector that target formal exclusionary institutions of the past
may not be adequate to reduce or eliminate various forms of
exclusion in “new” Nepal. Exclusionary informal institutions
have to be targeted by new formal institutions to reduce or
eliminate them.
Tiwari presents four categories of inequality employing
the horizontal inequality concept. His paper contributes to
the discussion of exclusion in at least two ways. First, even
though the concept of horizontal inequality in the Nepali
context was introduced as a spatial-horizontal concept earlier
(Murshed and Gates 2005), Tiwari uses it with regard to ethnic
groups more specifically. The concept will help to clarify the
frequent confusion between class/vertical inequalities with
inequality among groups. Critics of ethnic social justice
movements often argue that poor Bahuns also face oppressive
conditions. However, a poor Bahun does not suffer from
an additional oppression of untouchability that a poor Dalit
does, or the ethnic prejudice a poor member of a marginalized
ethnic group endures. Furthermore, untouchability and
ethnic prejudice have additional consequences for those
who must endure them.2 Second, Tiwari presents four
categories, namely inequality in cultural, political, economic
and social outcomes. This is more comprehensive than
earlier categorizations that pointed out, often separately but
occasionally together as well, exclusion in cultural, political
and policy realms (NC-IP-Nepal 1993; Bhattachan 1997;
Neupane 2000; Lawoti 2002, 2005). Tiwari provides data to
show that ethnic groups also face inequalities in economic
and social outcomes.3
Shakya does not directly look at exclusion or inequality
but her article contributes to understanding how control of the
state has consequences for ethnic inequality in the economy,
which is often considered outside the realm of culture, by
showing the historic and contemporary role of the state in the
business sector. She argues that ethnicity played a vital role
in advantaging members of the ruling group and their allies
and disadvantaging members of non-ruling groups. Members
2. Compared to ethnic groups, the concept of horizontal inequality
may not capture the overwhelming inequality faced by Dalits, who are
vertically subordinated to the “high” caste groups (Horowitz 1985: 2136). The horizontal inequality concept assumes that groups are different
and separate horizontally. However, if the notion of horizontal inequality
is employed simultaneously with vertical inequality, the combined use of
the two concepts may capture more fully the situation of the Dalits, who
comprise a separate but subordinated group.
3. I have elsewhere identified exclusion in eight spheres (exclusion in
citizenship/participation; governance; policy; cultural; symbols; civil society;
knowledge generation and dissemination; and economy) (Lawoti 2010,
unpublished monograph).
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of the ruling ethnic group benefitted with assignments in
the lucrative sectors and from contracts and deals due to
its connection with the state. Other non-ruling groups like
the Newar were also engaged in the business sector but they
rarely benefitted from state patronage. In fact, they have
suffered due to state negligence and discriminatory policies,
such as the requirement, following Hindu traditions, to
purify after foreign travel.4 Shakya points out that the biases
continued even after liberal market reforms were introduced
and implemented in the mid eighties and nineties.
Kantha’s article, on the other hand, does not discuss
ethnicity or exclusion and inequalities but nevertheless
has relevance for these topics. Employing concepts and
ideas from the vast democratic transition literature, Kantha
points out that three transitions to democracy have already
failed in Nepal. If a large number of people belonging to
marginalized groups are excluded even during democracy,
the democratic polity may not be perceived as legitimate by
those who are excluded. In such circumstances, first, the
democratic polity may be weak due to the lack of popular
support. Second, the anti-democratic forces may cultivate
the excluded and dissatisfied groups, as seen during King
Mahendra’s cooptation of indigenous and Madhesi leaders
after the 1960 royal coup and after the dismissal of the elected
government in 2002 by the then King Gyanendra (Lawoti
2008), in addition to the mobilization of excluded groups.
The multiple failures of previous democratic transitions
suggest that if various forms of exclusion are not addressed
during the ongoing transition, then exclusion may hinder
consolidation of democracy this time also.

Inclusive reforms since the 2006 regime
change
The regime transition of 2006 has brought major political
transformations, and unlike the previous transitions has
made some significant impact on exclusion/inclusion as well.
The state was declared secular in 2006 while the Hindu
Kingship was eliminated in 2008. Citizenship certificates
were distributed in 2007 to more than two million Nepalis
who were denied them earlier, mostly Madhesi but others
as well. The Madhesi movement of 2007 also forced the
ruling coalition partners to amend the Interim Constitution
to declare that the country would adopt a federal structure
in place of the unitary system. The reservation policy begun
in 2003 by the royal regime was expanded after 2006 to
include the Madhesi as well. The election to the Constituent
Assembly in 2008 was conducted with a mixed proportional
electoral method that helped to elect many members of the
marginalized groups. Even though public holidays are still
overwhelmingly on CHHE festivals, many holidays have
4. Janga Bahadur Rana also went through the purification ritual after
his return from Europe but for him it was a one-time affair and the practice
legitimized his rule. For Newar traders prior to modern times it was a
repeated and costly affair.
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been declared for indigenous nationalities, Christian and
Muslim festivals. Likewise a few indigenous nationalities
have been added to the rooster of the mostly CHHE national
heroes declared by the state.5
The progress in terms of representation in various state
organs, however, is mixed. The Constituent Assembly has
become the most representative legislature ever in Nepali
history. However, the Dalit are still underrepresented despite
significant progress. The cabinet is less representative than the
Constituent Assembly. The Madhesi and Dalit have increased
their representation in the cabinet but representation of
the indigenous nationalities has declined.6 The judiciary
and bureaucracy are still highly unrepresentative where
the domination of CHHE is still disproportionately high
(Lawoti forthcoming).7 The ceremonial president and vice
president are Madhesi and the Constituent Assembly chair is
an indigenous nationality but the powerful executive is still
headed by a male Bahun. All the major parties are still led by
CHHEM. Despite these shortcomings on the representational
sector and with other issues like ethnic autonomy and equal
recognition of native languages not yet decided, on balance
the 2006 transition has brought the most inclusive reform in
Nepal’s history.

Tentative thoughts on factors
contributing to reform
Transitions, by definition, bring changes and the 1951,
1979-80, 1990 and 2006 transitions that Kantha discusses
were changes towards democracy. However, as pointed out
before, the earlier transitions did not herald major inclusive
reforms. In fact, as Lawoti and Tiwari point out, exclusion
continued even during the 1990-2002 democratic years.
5. In 2066 v. s. (2009-10), 10 percent and 1.43 percent public
holidays were declared for the festivals of non-Newar Hill and Tarai
indigenous nationalities. respectively. The proportion of holidays on CHHE
festivals had declined as a result but still stood at 54.29 percent. In 2057 v.
s. (2000-01), 68.85 percent of public holidays were on CHHE festivals while
holidays for non-Newar indigenous nationalities, Muslims, and Christian
festivals were nil (Lawoti forthcoming).
6. The non-Dalit Madhesi caste groups’ representation reached 18.5
percent and that of Dalit 7.5 percent during the 2006-2009 period while the
representation of non-Newar indigenous nationalities declined to 16 percent.
The average representation of indigenous nationalities was 16.1, 16.7
and 27.1 percent during 2002-2006, 1990-2002 and 1976-1990 periods
respectively (Lawoti, forthcoming).
7. The Dalit, non-Newar indigenous nationalities, and Madhesi were
underrepresented at 0, 5.63 and 11.27 percent respectively in the judiciary
during the 2006-2009 years while the CHHE dominated with 64.82 percent.
The CHHE domination in bureaucracy (special class and equivalent) was
83.93 percent in 2009 while Dalit, non-Newar indigenous nationalities,
and Madhesi had representation of 0, 0 and 8.93 percent respectively (Tarai
indigenous nationalities are included in the Madhesi category in this count
of bureaucracy to make it comparable with the 1999 data where Neupane
had lumped them in the Madhesi category).
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In this context, what led to the current inclusive reforms?
Literature point out that democratic process, insurgency
and rebellions, regime change, and social movements could
facilitate reforms. Which political process or events facilitated
them in 2006 (and not during earlier transitions)?
The democratization literature mentions that the opening
up of the polity could lead to further reforms. Introduction of
mass electoral politics empowers voters, and citizens could vote
for their choice, forcing democratic leaders to respond if they
want to perform well in future elections (Dahl 1971; O’Donnell
and Schmitter 1986). According to this logic, the demands
and pressure upon the democratic political actors would force
the state to respond and introduce reforms. However, this
did not happen in Nepal with regard to inclusive reforms
during the past democratic epochs. Major reforms to address
demands for federalism, the proportional electoral system, a
secular state, the three language policy, reservations in public
offices and admission to education institutions, citizenship
certificates to those without them, and an end to substantial
cultural and caste discrimination were not initiated during
the 1990-2002 democratic years.8 Only minor reforms,
such as issuance of a few stamps commemorating heroes of
the marginalized groups, establishment of powerless and
financially strapped Dalit and Women commissions and the
foundation for the indigenous nationalities, were carried out.
The Nepali experience suggests that a democratic regime
may be more responsive than an autocratic one, but it may
only introduce minor reforms. This supports the thesis that
policy changes in democracies usually occur incrementally
if there are no major crises (Truman 1951; Lindblom 1959).
Major reforms were obstructed in Nepal because the state
was overwhelmingly dominated by the dominant group and
the democratic rule of the game was set up based on the
majoritarian principle where most of the state power was
enjoyed by the party/group in power.9
Since major reforms did not occur during the democratic
years, the Nepali case suggests that democracy by itself may
not lead to major inclusive reforms. The question then is
what or which event or process caused the major inclusive
8. The demand for the three language policy, which was made by
native language groups, calls for teaching an international language, a
countrywide medium language, and a local/regional language in schools.
Citizenship certificates were not awarded to many Madhesi and others,
including children of women married to foreigners. Cultural discrimination
included absence of public holidays on non-CHHE festivals, absence of nonCHHE heroes and imposition of CHHE values on others.
9. In fact, majoritarian democratic institutions could facilitate
discrimination and exclusion of minorities because the government may
respond to the narrow preferences of the majority group, as seen in Sri
Lanka (Tambiah 1986; DeVotta 2004). A consensus system, which is an
opposite democratic model, shares powers among different actors, including
opposition and minorities, and different level of governments. It is more
often found in ethnically divided established democracies (Lijphart 1977,
1999).

transformations in Nepal after 2006? The social movement
literature argues that if people mobilize, such collective actions
could pressure governments to introduce reforms (McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). This argument
is supported by transitions towards democracy (1951,
1979-80, 1990, and 2006) that Kantha discusses because
those transitions occurred due to popular mobilizations
that demanded democratic reforms. However, the social
movements of the excluded groups in the nineties were not
able to get major inclusive concessions. One explanation
for the failure of the social justice movements is that the
movements, despite exploding in the 1990s, were relatively
new and they may not have developed enough organizational
and mobilizational strengths (Lawoti 2005). Whatever
the reasons, it is clear that the social justice movements of
the excluded groups were not able to bring major inclusive
changes, which were introduced only after the 2006 regime
change.
Once the regime change occurred in 2006, however, the
Madhesi utilized the fluid opportunity to launch a successful
movement in 2007 that forced the government to accept
federalism. It also significantly contributed in making
the government accept the mixed electoral method for the
Constituent Assembly election. Here it should be noted
that the Madhesi movement became successful only after
the 2006 regime change. Scholars have pointed out that
transition period could witness mobilization for changes
because the old institutions are dismantled or discredited but
new institutions are not set and the fluid situation generates
incentives for change seeking agents to mobilize and push
for changes as they rightly perceive that changes are more
possible during transitions (Gurr 2000; Jarstad and Sisk
2008). A combination of fluid situation due to the ongoing
transition and particularly the Madhesi movement that
became successful because of it at that particular juncture,
contributed in heralding a few major inclusive reforms but
other major reforms had already taken place. This brief
discussion shows that social movements by themselves did
not bring about the major inclusive changes in the country
before the 2006 transition.
The Maoists, an insurgency as well as a social movement,
are often credited with pushing for major transformations,
including in ethnic relations, and putting them on the
country’s socio-political agenda, as Shakya points out in her
piece in this issue. The Maoists contributed in highlighting
the issue of exclusion much more than any other major
political force. They also politicized the rural periphery
with their organization and rebellion related activities
(recruitment, expansion, publicity campaign, control and
governance etc.) (see Mottin 2009; Eck 2009; Joshi 2009).
The Maoist implemented social reforms by penalizing sex,
caste and ethnic prejudices and crimes in rural areas under
their control (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009), declaring autonomous
ethnic regions, and including more indigenous and Dalit
leaders in their party and front organizations (Lawoti 2009).
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They created considerable pressure for inclusive changes and
it might have contributed to the eventual reforms, but their
pressure alone was not sufficient to force the government
to introduce major inclusive reforms in the state during the
insurgency period.10
As pointed out before, the major inclusive reforms only
came after the 2006 transition. The 2006 regime change
and subsequent inclusive reforms points out a few things
if analyzed from a historical perspective. First, regime
change from autocracy can facilitate inclusive reforms but
as demonstrated by the 1990 and earlier transitions, regime
change is not sufficient to bring about inclusive reforms.
Except for cooptation of a few minority individuals and minor
reforms, substantial inclusive reforms did not occur during
the earlier democratic transitions. The question then is how
was the 2006 transition different from earlier ones? The forces
that were demanding or committed to inclusive reforms (the
Maoists, ethnic organizations and ethnic parties) were a
part of the coalition that forced the royal regime to buckle
down in 2006 while powerful inclusion seeking forces were
absent in earlier democratic transitions. The regime change
was possible with the joint mobilization of the civil society
(including ethnic organizations), parliamentary political
parties (including ethnic parties),11 and the Maoists.12
10. The argument is not that the government and the parliamentary
parties did not feel the pressure but that the pressure was not sufficient
to force the government into introducing major inclusive reforms. The
only major reform during the insurgency was reservations for Dalit and
indigenous nationalities in the public sector and admissions to educational
institutions in 2003, introduced during the Royal regime. This partly
supports the thesis that competition among political forces could lead
to reforms but in this instance the competition did not occur among
democratic parliamentary parties but between the parliamentary parties and
the non-democratic monarchy.
11. The parliamentary political parties had reluctantly adopted
some of the demands for inclusion during the mobilization against the
royal takeover to attract the excluded groups and to arrest the increasing
influence of the Maoists among the excluded groups. Ethnic organizations
like the NEFIN (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities) and
its constituent organizations, and ethnic political parties like Nepal
Sadhbhawana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party) faction that participated in
the movement lobbied, advocated and pressured the larger parliamentary
parties to adopt inclusive agendas, while ethnic members of the different
political parties pressured their respective organizations to adopt inclusive
agendas. Through the work of the identity movements since 1990, the
larger society and parliamentary parties had also become more aware of the
grievances of the excluded groups.
12. Ironically, it was the Royal intervention against the democratic
regime that brought together these diverse forces, which were often at
odds before 2005. The dismissal of the elected government in 2002 took
power away from the parliamentary political parties and pushed them to
the streets against the monarchy. A second aspect of the irony is that
the Maoists, an anti democratic force that initially launched their rebellion
against the parliamentary democratic polity in 1996, were possibly the
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Even though the ethnic organizations and movements and
the Maoists themselves were not able to bring about major
inclusive reforms, they played a significant role in the struggle
for regime change, and during the transition that heralded
inclusive reforms. The inclusive reform oriented forces were
strong and well placed during the 2006 transition to push
through those reforms. This was the proximate factor leading
to the inclusive reforms during the 2006 regime transition.13
The third important link in identifying the underlying
factor for the inclusive reforms is to trace how the forces
seeking inclusion grew and became powerful enough to push
them through. Beyond the aspirations of the excluded groups
to share power that almost always existed to varying degrees,
what enabled them to become a force that could push the
reforms through? This question forces us to recognize the role
of democracy in providing an enabling environment for the
marginalized groups to organize and mobilize for their rights
and become empowered. The growth of ethnic organizations
and mobilization became possible during the 1990-2002
democratic years. As mentioned earlier the mobilization of
ethnic groups increased dramatically after 1990. Numerous
ethnic actors and organizations built cultural capital by
reasserting their religions, their cultures, and by spreading
the discourse of their rights during the democratic years.
NEFIN and its constituent organizations were established
and expanded during this period. Likewise, the Madhesi
Janadhikar Forum (Madhesi Peoples’ Rights Forum) that
led the 2007 Madhesi movement also set up its organization
during late nineties and early twenty-first century.14 The
Maoist mobilization of the excluded groups also became
feasible in mid and late nineties after the marginalized groups
became aware of their inequalities and increasingly became
alienated with the non-responsive polity.
The Maoists, who played a major role in bringing about the
transition and pushing for inclusive reforms, also benefitted
from the democratic regime and its guarantee of political
largest contributor to the regime change for democracy in 2006 that ushered
in inclusive reforms as well. The Maoists first precipitated a crisis for the
establishment by spreading the insurgency rapidly, especially in the eyes of
the monarchy and the Royal Nepal Army, and facilitated the dismissal of the
elected government by the King in 2002. This in turn helped to exacerbate
the crisis further by polarizing different socio-political forces into two camps.
13. One prominent indigenous activist told me that during the
movement for the restoration of democracy, some of the second rung leaders
of the movement, who set the programs and agendas for the struggle,
belonged to the indigenous groups and they were instrumental in pushing
through the declaration proclaiming the secularity of the state during the
transition. This was confirmed by indigenous politicians who operated
as the second rung leadership during the movement. This undermines
the claim of some (Shah 2008) that it was the external forces that were
responsible for declaring Nepal a secular state.
14. The MJF grew much larger after the success of the 2007 movement
but its skeletal organization in most of the Tarai districts enabled it to launch
and to provide leadership to the Madhesi movement.
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rights and civil liberties. They expanded and grew partly
because the democratic regime tolerated their early political
activities such as street protests, expansion of organization,
and preparation for the insurgency. Unlike in 1971 when the
authoritarian regime brutally repressed an armed uprising
by the extreme left in East Nepal, the cost of repression
increased for the democratic regime due to its pluralistic
and tolerant politics. Likewise many Maoist cadres were set
free by the court through habeas corpus rights guaranteed
by a democratic polity. The free media, which became more
professional and which expanded in the nineties, also gave
considerable coverage to the Maoists agendas, issues and
activities (Mishra 2004).
The above discussion makes clear that even though
social justice movements of the marginalized groups, the
Maoists, the democratic parliamentary forces, and even
regime transition per se did not bring about the inclusive
reforms by themselves, their collective efforts at a particular
juncture contributed to the endeavor. However, the more
important and final factor contributing to inclusive reforms
was the decade long democratic regime of 1990-2002. The
democratic years provided enabling conditions for inclusive
reform seeking forces to grow and sensitized the larger
society and parliamentary political parties to the demands of
the excluded groups so that they agreed to changes forcefully
proposed by the social forces seeking a more inclusive polity
during the 2006 transition process.
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